

Risks of Data Science (What could go wrong?)

Joana Gonçalves de Sá

June 30th 2022

ROADMAP

1. (Some) problems with methods
2. (Some) problems with data
3. Examples of applications gone wrong
4. (Some) possible solutions / approaches

ROADMAP

1. (Some) problems with methods
 1. Fisher or Bayes (p-values, priors)?
 2. Should we have hypothesis?
 3. How can we deal with randomness?
 4. Can we really validate results that are non-interpretable?
 5. Signal to noise identification in rare events
2. (Some) problems with data
 1. Incomplete
 2. Non-random biases (sampling, prejudice, systematic value distortion)
 3. Private/personal
3. Examples of applications gone wrong
 1. Human Bias / interpretation
 2. When recommendation systems fail
 3. When recommendation systems work
4. (Some) possible solutions / approaches
 1. Auditing
 2. Myth busting

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


Breast cancer prevalence is quite low, with only 1.4% of women having it


If a woman does not have cancer (NC) the probability of having a positive (+) mammogram is 10%

If a woman has cancer (BC), it will be detected by the mammogram 75% of the time



What is the probability of having cancer, given that the mammogram was positive?





1000 hypotheses to test



Women with Breast Cancer (14 of 1000)

-  Positive mammogram (true positive) (11 of 14)
-  Negative mammogram (false negative) (3 of 14)

Women Without Breast Cancer (986 of 1000)

-  Positive mammogram (false positive) (99 of 986)
-  Negative mammogram (true negative) (887 of 986)

True Positives ~ 79%



$$P(A | B) = P(B | A)P(A)/P(B)$$

Breast cancer prevalence is quite low, with only 1.4% of women having it


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
What is the probability of having cancer, given that the mammogram was positive?

$$P(BC | +) = P(+ | BC)P(BC)/P(+)$$

~ 0.1



	Null Hypothesis True	Null Hypothesis False
Reject Null Hypothesis	Type I Error	Correct
Fail to Reject Null Hypothesis	Correct	Type II Error



$$z = \frac{\bar{x} - \mu_0}{\sigma / \sqrt{n}}$$

population mean: μ

hypothesized mean: μ_0

population standard deviation: σ

sample mean: \bar{x}

sample size: n

You have a randomly selected sample.

The sample is significantly smaller than the population.

The variable in question has a Normal distribution.

We "know" the population standard deviation.



$P(\text{detecting an effect when there is none}) = \alpha$

$P(\text{detecting an effect when it exists}) = 1 - \alpha$

$P(\text{detecting an effect when it exists on every experiment } k) = (1 - \alpha)^k$
($k=50$)

$P(\text{detecting an effect when there is none on at least one experiment})$
 $= 1 - (1 - \alpha)^k$




$P(\text{detecting an effect when there is none}) = \alpha$ **0.05**

$P(\text{detecting an effect when it exists}) = 1 - \alpha$ **0.95**

$P(\text{detecting an effect when it exists on every experiment } k) = (1 - \alpha)^k$
($k=50$) **0.077**

$P(\text{detecting an effect when there is none on at least one experiment}) = 1 - (1 - \alpha)^k$ **0.932**





Example 1: Sample size = 10

Two-sample T Results

	N	Mean	StDev	SE Mean
C4	10	5.011	0.748	0.24
C5	10	5.020	0.803	0.25

Difference = μ (C4) - μ (C5)

Estimate for difference: -0.009

95% CI for difference: (-0.741, 0.723)

T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -0.03 P-Value = 0.979 DF = 17

With 10 observations, the difference (-0.009) is not statistically significant



Example 2: Sample size = 1,000,000

Two-sample T Results

	N	Mean	StDev	SE Mean
C1	1000000	5.01	1.00	0.0010
C2	1000000	5.02	1.00	0.0010

Difference = μ (C1) - μ (C2)

Estimate for difference: -0.00912

95% CI for difference: (-0.01189, -0.00635)

T-Test of difference = 0 (vs not =): T-Value = -6.45 P-Value = 0.000 DF = 1999994

With a million observations, the same difference (-0.009) is statistically significant!



“So why did Fisher dismiss the theory? One reason may have been that he was a paid consultant of the tobacco companies. Another may have been that he was a lifelong smoker himself. And Fisher liked to be contrarian and controversial, and disliked anything that smacked of puritanism. In short, he was biased, in a variety of ways.”



Should we have hypothesis?



“All who drink of this remedy recover in a short time except those whom it does not help, who all die”

“It is obvious, therefore, that it fails only in incurable cases.”

Galen

Randomized control trials
Training and testing
Validation

associations: a study of astrological signs and health


[Peter C. Austin](#)  , [Muhammad M. Mamdani](#), [David N. Juurlink](#), [Janet E. Hux](#)

Study Design and Setting

We conducted a study of all 10,674,945 residents of Ontario aged between 18 and 100 years in 2000. Residents were randomly assigned to equally sized derivation and validation cohorts and classified according to their astrological sign. Using the derivation cohort, we searched through 223 of the most common diagnoses for hospitalization until we identified two for which subjects born under one astrological sign had a significantly higher probability of hospitalization compared to subjects born under the remaining signs combined ($P < 0.05$).

Results

We tested these 24 associations in the independent validation cohort. Residents born under Leo had a higher probability of gastrointestinal hemorrhage ($P = 0.0447$), while Sagittarians had a higher probability of humerus fracture ($P = 0.0123$) compared to all other signs combined.



Stranger BE, et al., Progress and Promise of Genome-Wide Association Studies for Human Complex Trait Genetics, Genetics, 2011

Manhattan plot for RA GWAS meta-analysis. Statistical strength of association ($-\log_{10}P$) is plotted against genomic position with the 22 autosomal chromosomes in different colors. The blue horizontal line indicates the genome-wide significance threshold of $P = 5 \times 10^{-8}$; the red line is a threshold for "suggestive" association ($P = 10^{-5}$). SNPs at 5 of 29 loci known from previous studies (gene symbols shown), and one of the 10 new loci identified in this study (marked by red triangles), achieved genome-wide significance in this meta-analysis (prior to the replication phase of the study). Over 200 SNPs representing 35 loci achieved $P < 10^{-5}$, versus roughly 10 expected by chance.

1. We don't need hypothesis
2. We often don't have samples
3. Old statistics, new methods

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
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With a million observations, the same difference (-0.009) is statistically significant!





Millikan (notebooks)
 Millikan (published)
 Erik Backlin, Nature 1929
 [Birge, 1929]
 Backlin and Flemberg, Nature 1936
 Backlin and Flemberg, cited in HR Robinson RPP 1937
 Gunnar Kellström PR 1936
 [Birge, 1942]
 [Dummond and Cohen, 1963]
 [Taylor et al, 1969]
 [Cohen and Taylor, 1973]
 [Cohen and Taylor, 1987]

We have learned a lot from experience about **how to handle some of the ways we fool ourselves**.

(...) Millikan measured the charge on an electron by an experiment with falling oil drops, and got an answer which we now know not to be quite right. It's a little bit off because he had the incorrect value for the viscosity of air. It's interesting to look at the history of measurements of the charge of an electron, after Millikan. If you plot them as a function of time, you find that one is a little bit bigger than Millikan's, and the next one's a little bit bigger than that, and the next one's a little bit bigger than that, until finally they settle down to a number which is higher.


Why didn't they discover the new number was higher right away? It's a thing that scientists are ashamed of—this history—because it's apparent that people did things like this: When they got a number that was too high above Millikan's, they thought something must be wrong—and they would look for and find a reason why something might be wrong. When they got a number close to Millikan's value they didn't look so hard. And so they eliminated the numbers that were too far off, and did other things like that”

<https://hsm.stackexchange.com/questions/264/timeline-of-measurements-of-the-electrons-charge>

Richard Feynman “Surely you’re joking Mr. Feynman!” 1997

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



Figure 9. Stick men drawn by LOGO programs (from Sussman, 1973)

Thinking: Readings in Cognitive Science, (1978) edited by P. N. Johnson-Laird, P. C. Wason, page 26.

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
And you will read this at the end






**You will read
this first**

And then you will read this
Then this one

FIGURE 1: ONE THOUSAND AND ONE DAYS OF HISTORY



Nassim Taleb







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
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FIGURE 5-5: TRUE DISTRIBUTION OF DATA





Adapted from The Signal and the Noise, Nate Silver, Penguin Books



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
Bias in medical devices

A device can be biased if its design disadvantages certain groups on the basis of their physical attributes, such as skin color. For example, pulse oximeters (see the photo) detect changes in light passed through skin and are less effective in people with dark skin. Computational techniques are biased if training datasets are not representative of the population. Interpretation of results may be biased according to demographic groups, for example, with the use of “correction factors.”


Physical bias



Computational bias





Interpretation bias



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
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Anchoring Effect

How happy are you with your life?


How many dates did you have last month?




<https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing>

- Particularly likely to falsely flag black defendants as future criminals, wrongly labelling them this way at almost twice the rate as white defendants.
- White defendants were mislabelled as low risk more often than black defendants.

Black Defendants' Risk Scores



White Defendants' Risk Scores



Prediction Fails Differently for Black Defendants

	WHITE	AFRICAN AMERICAN
Labeled Higher Risk, But Didn't Re-Offend	23.5%	44.9%
Labeled Lower Risk, Yet Did Re-Offend	47.7%	28.0%

Welfare surveillance system violates human rights, Dutch court rules

Government told to halt use of AI to detect fraud in decision hailed by privacy campaigners



World

Africa

Americas

Asia

Australia

More

Dutch government resigns over child welfare fraud scandal

By Rosanne Roobeek, James Frater and Niamh Kennedy, CNN

🕒 Updated 1622 GMT (0022 HKT) January 15, 2021



Fernando Masao
Presidento ISPS
Co-founder at Closer



Cornelia Abernethy
Founder at AI Trust, Speaker on
Cognitive & Artificial Intelligence



Joana Gonçalves de Sá
Principal Investigator at Instituto
Lusitano de Ciência



Steven Smekersveld
CEO Continental Europe & Spain
CEO Grupo Agor Portugal



Miguel Castro Neto
Professor and Academic Dean at
Nova IMS



David Mangel
Science Writer at Ciência Viva / Inst. de
Tecnologia Química e Biológica
Arbório Xavier



Jose R. Iria
Head of Digital Transformation at
Bio Mobilis



Miguel Carvalho
Founder and CEO at Juby



Soares de Andrade Jr.
Deputy Dean at Universidade Federal
Coar & Professor of Physics



Paula Panams
General Manager at
Microsoft



Harry Powell
Director of Corporate Analytics at
Jaguar Land Rover



Dulce Mota
CEO at Jethelbank



Bruno Horta Soares
IT Executive Senior Advisor at IDC



Paul van der Soor
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Good Europe



Nicolas Seguy
Managing Director at Jungle Convergence
S.A.



Carolina Almeida Cruz
On Vision (CEO) at SSP-UNL



Fernando Gaglio
Associate Professor at Nova IMS



Pedro Afonso
CEO at Solano Portugal



Daniel Trapa
Dean at Nova School of Business and
Economics



Paulo Pereira de Silva
President at Renova



Almeida Henriques
President at Câmara Municipal de
Lous, President of Smart Cities Group
at DHP



Lucie Lambert
Editor of the Middle East Journal of
Positive Psychology



Duarte Cordeiro
Vice-President at Câmara Municipal
de Lisboa



Conselheiro Mota
3rd and 4th Applications Manager
at Realidade



Marco Costa
General Manager EMS at Tallade



Rada Vynnyetskaia
AI/Blockchain Development Manager at
Closer



Manuel Dias
Director Enterprise Technical Sales
and AI Ambassador at Microsoft



Andrew Morrissey
Senior Sport Scientist STS Sports



João Abreu Mariano
CEO at JAMES



Miguel Raposo Alves
CEO at Global Global Investor



Margarida Roel
OpenW Product Manager @ Realist



Fernando Rocha de Silva
Partner at Vitoria de Almeida &
Associados



Nobuaki Tanaka
President & CEO, Universal Shell
Programming Laboratory, Founder of
Unizgo



Hugo Ribeiro de Silva
Managing Director at Bentley,
Parade Porto-Itaja



António Alegria
Head of Artificial Intelligence at
OutSystems



Gonçalo Sousa
Consultant at Portuguese National
Cybersecurity Center




Carlos Rodrigues
Lead Cloud Engineer & Data Scientist
at Marionato



Ricardo Pinheiro
President at Câmara Municipal Campo
Maior




Pedro Gaspar
Remote Business Technology Director
at GIMA



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

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


WILL IoT HELP US BECOME HAPPIER?

What if a picture knew it was making you feel calmer, more mindful...just happier?

Using
sensors,
apps &
museums
to enable
wellbeing





why am i so

why am i so **tired**
 why am i so **ugly**
 why am i so **gassy**
 why am i so **thirsty**
 why am i so **angry**
 why am i so **itchy**
 why am i so **sad**
 why am i so **hungry**
 why am i so **emotional**
 why am i so **bloated**

como posso ser |

como posso ser **amigo de alguem**
 como posso ser **feliz**
 como posso ser **inteligente**
 como posso ser **uma pessoa melhor**
 como posso ser **salvo**
 como posso ser **rico**
 como posso ser **feliz sozinho**
 como posso ser **um hacker**
 como posso ser **popular no facebook**
 como posso ser **cantora**

pourquoi je suis

pourquoi je suis **moche**
 pourquoi je suis **triste**
 pourquoi je suis **toujours fatigué**
 pourquoi je suis **célibataire**
 pourquoi je suis **toujours célibataire**
 pourquoi je suis **devenu rebelle pdf**
 pourquoi je suis **seule**
 pourquoi je suis **toujours fatiguée**
 pourquoi je suis **jalouse**
 pourquoi je suis **triste sans raison**

how to


how to **make slime**
 how to **tie a tie**
 how to **buy bitcoin**
 how to **lose weight**
 how to **draw**
 how to **buy ripple**
 how to **kiss**
 how to **make pancakes**
 how to **mine bitcoin**
 how to **train your dragon**

como é que se


como é que se **beija**
 como é que se **diz eu te amo**
 como é que se **beija de lingua**
 como é que se **engravidar**
 como é que se **beija na boca**
 como é que se **escreve**
 como é que se **beija pela primeira vez**
 como é que se **faz um facebook**
 como é que se **faz um relatório**
 como é que se **faz panquecas**

comment faire


comment faire **du slime**
 comment faire **un cv**
 comment faire **des crepes**
 comment faire **une dissertation**
 comment faire **une capture d'écran**
 comment faire **une bibliographie**
 comment faire **un gâteau**
 comment faire **du caramel**
 comment faire **de la glue**
 comment faire **du pain**



WE CREATED A MACROSCOPE



WE CREATED A MACROSCOPE



- SECURITY BREACHES
- PRIVACY CONCERNS
- ETHICAL CONCERNS
- DATASET BIAS
- ALGORITHMIC BIAS
- INSTRUMENTATION BIAS

ROADMAP

1. (Some) problems with methods
 1. Fisher or Bayes (p-values, priors)?
 2. Should we have hypothesis?
 3. How can we deal with randomness?
 4. Can we really validate results that are non-interpretable?
 5. Signal to noise identification in rare events
2. (Some) problems with data
 1. Incomplete
 2. Non-random biases (sampling, prejudice, systematic value distortion)
 3. Private/personal
3. Examples of applications gone wrong
 1. Human Bias / interpretation
 2. When recommendation systems fail
 3. When recommendation systems work
4. (Some) possible solutions / approaches
 1. Auditing
 2. Myth busting

1. ACCEPTANCE – We have a problem
2. TRAINING – Like today
3. INCLUSION AND DIVERSITY – In teams, projects, etc
4. AUDITING – Know your data
5. DE-BIASING – When possible
6. TRANSPARENCY – If you can't be right, be honest
7. INTERACTION – Teach, engage, change the ones, legislate

Bias and Fairness Audit Toolkit

The Bias Report is powered by [Aequitas](#), an open-source bias audit toolkit for machine learning developers, analysts, and policymakers to audit machine learning models for discrimination and bias, and make informed and equitable decisions around developing and deploying predictive risk-assessment tools.



False Positive Rate Parity: **Failed**

What is it?

This criteria considers an attribute to have False Positive parity if every group has the same False Positive Error Rate. For example, if race has false positive parity, it implies that all three races have the same False Positive Error Rate.

When does it matter?

If your desired outcome is to make false positive errors equally on people from all races, then you care about this criteria. This is important in cases where your intervention is punitive and has a risk of adverse outcomes for individuals. Using this criteria allows you to make sure that you are not making false positive mistakes about any single group disproportionately.

Which groups failed the audit:

For race (with reference group as **Caucasian**)
Asian with **0.37X** Disparity
African-American with **1.91X** Disparity
Native American with **1.60X** Disparity
Other with **0.63X** Disparity

From the Industrial Revolution to the Digital Revolution



First

Water and steam power is used to create mechanical production facilities.



1800

1784: First mechanical loom



Second

Electricity lets us create a division of labor and mass production.



1900

1870: First assembly line

Third

IT systems automate production lines further.



2000

1969: First programmable logic controller


Fourth

IoT and cloud technology automate complex tasks.



Today

From the Industrial Revolution to the Digital Revolution



Child Labor in the Industrial Revolution




- 9 year old limit
- 9-13 yo should not work > 9h a day
- 13-18yo should not work > 12h a day
- Four inspectors

1833 UK
Factory Act

1938 US Federal Fair
Labor Standards Act

1973: ILO Conference



Some myths

1. Models are neutral
2. More (data) is always better
3. If the model returns a highly likely results it must be true
4. ML models facilitate extrapolation
5. There is nothing we can do about privacy

Ask ourselves:

1. Am I using proxies and are they fare?
2. What happens if I get it wrong? What is the worst thing that can happen? – Punitive models
3. Can I update my model continuously?
4. Does the algorithm itself impact the results?

Popular reading on Data Science/Statistics/Social Physics:

- Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. *The black swan: The impact of the highly improbable*. Vol. 2. Random house, 2007.
- Silver, Nate. *The signal and the noise: the art and science of prediction*. Penguin UK, 2012
- Harford, Tim. "Big data: A big mistake?." *Significance* 11.5 (2014): 14-19.
- Pentland, Alex. *Social physics: How good ideas spread-the lessons from a new science*. Penguin, 2014.
- Lazer, David, et al. "Social science. Computational social science." *Science* (New York, NY) 323.5915 (2009): 721-723

Popular reading on AI risks

- Zuboff S (2019) *The age of surveillance capitalism: The fight for a human future at the new frontier of power*. Public Affairs, New York
- O'Neil C (2016) *Weapons of math destruction: how big data increases inequality and threatens democracy*. Crown Publishers, New York

Some specific examples:

- Amnesty International (2021) *Discrimination through unregulated use of algorithms in the Dutch childcare benefits scandal*.
- Saleiro P, Kuester B, Hinkson L, London J, Stevens A, Anisfeld A, Rodolfa KT, Ghani R (2018) *Aequitas: A bias and fairness audit toolkit*
- Kadambi, *Achieving fairness in medical devices*, *Science* Apr 2021

THANK YOU

socialcomplexity.eu

joanagsa@lip.pt

@mjoanasa

@spac_lab